A. Introduction
The first consultative paper on a new capital adequacy framework, which was issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, introduced the "three pillar" model which encompasses the minimum capital requirements, supervisory review and market discipline -"as a lever to strengthen disclosure and encourage safe and sound banking practices."
2 As well as the criticism related to the fact that it rewarded risk lending, the fact that "capital requirements were just reasonably related to banks' risk taking activities and that the credit exposure requirement was the same regardless of the credit rating of the borrower,"
3 a general criticism of Basel I relates to the fact that it promoted capital arbitrage. Such capital arbitrage being attributed to its wide risk categories which provided banks with the liberty to "arbitrage between their economic assessment of risk and the regulatory capital requirements." 4 "Regulatory capital arbitrage", a practice which involves banks "using securitisation to alter the profile of their book" usually produces the effect of making bank's capital ratios appear inflated.
5 Four identified types of capital arbitrage are:
6 cherry picking, securitisation with partial recourse, remote origination and indirect credit.
The Second Consultative Paper, issued by the Basel Committee in January 2001, introduced the two Internal Ratings Based (IRB) methodologies -the Foundational IRB and the Advanced IRB methodologies. The Internal Ratings Based approach to capital requirements for credit risk, not only relies significantly on the internal assessment carried out by a bank, in relation to counterparties and exposures, but is also geared towards the achievement of two primary goals, namely: 7 "additional risk sensitivity" and "incentive compatibility".
Basel 2 is premised on a three level approach which permits banks to select from three models, namely: the basic standardized model, the IRB foundation approach and the advanced ratings approach. See ibid; Bank's capital ratio may appear inflated "relative to the riskiness of the remaining exposure" see ibid 6 Ibid at pages 22-24 7 In establishing an Internal Ratings Based approach, the Committee's intention was directed at "fine tuning capital requirements with a greater degree of accuracy to the level of a bank's exposure to credit risks." Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'The Internal Ratings Based Approach' Supporting Document to the New Basel Capital Accord 2001 at pages 1 and 3 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca05.pdf According to the Consultative Document on Standard Approach to Credit Risk, 8 capital requirements under the standardized approach are considered to be more synchronised and in harmony with the principal elements of banking risk -owing to the introduction of more differentiated risk weights and a broader recognition of techniques which are applied in mitigating risk whilst such techniques attempt to avoid undue complexity. As a result, capital ratios generated through the standardized approach, should adapt more to present and actual risks encountered by banks, than was the case previously.
Under Pillar One minimum capital requirements, operational risk is to be corroborated by capital. Measurement approaches for operational risk can be found in the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) and there are three broad approaches to the capital assessment of operational risk which are as follows:
The developments and evolution across the Basel Capital Accords have illustrated their focus to address prevailing financial risks at the time, their focus on the regulation of complex financial instruments such as hedge funds, the pro cyclical nature of risks and the need to mitigate occurrences related to regulatory capital arbitrage. The era of Basel III has also witnessed the introduction of liquidity standards -these being the first of their kind, However the need to address off balance sheet instruments, complex derivative products, exposures of various kinds -and particularly those exposures relating to derivatives, off balance sheet and leverage, as well as those risks attributed to non-bank institutions, continually constitute a vital focal point.
The ensuing section considers the most recent updates that have taken place since the 2013 Revised Basel Leverage Ratios were proposed -as well as the 2013 U.S Supplementary Leverage Ratios. Section B traces the Basel Committee's efforts to update the original 2010 Basel III Leverage Ratiosas well as U.S proposals and revisions to supplement Basel Leverage Ratios. Section C then analyses and considers the significance of adjustments to components of the Basel III Leverage Ratio and also recent updates to these components In re-capping and highlighting developments which have taken place since the introduction of the 2013 Rule and the Final Rule, the more recent Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratios (ESLR) -2014 U.S Revisions, are considered under section D. This will be followed by a consideration of how far consistency, comparability and harmonization could actually be achieved, the importance of achieving these goals, before a conclusion is arrived at.
B. Basel Committee's Efforts to Update Original 2010 Basel III Leverage Ratios and U.S Proposals to Enhance Basel Leverage Ratios
Several revisions, particularly relating to the denominator component of the Basel III Leverage Ratio, have recently been undertaken by the Basel Committee, as illustrated in its June 2013 Guidelines, and more recently, its January 2014 Standard. From this viewpoint, measures aimed at minimising regulatory capital arbitrage become all the more evident since banks are able to manipulate their way into increasing the leverage ratio by getting many assets allowed in the numerator and as little in the denominator: "cherry picking" arbitrage having constituted a problem since the original Basel Capital Accord. Hence it could be argued that it is not the mere increase of leverage ratios that truly matters (even though this is also important), but measures aimed at ensuring that permissible contents/instruments are incorporated into the numerators and denominators of such leverage ratios.
Certain factors influential in the recent proposals and efforts aimed at achieving higher leverage capital requirements, according to U.S federal agencies, 9 include the belief that higher standards for the supplementary leverage ratio would reduce the likelihood of resolutions, and would allow regulators more time to tailor resolution efforts in the event those are needed. In their opinion, by further constraining their use of leverage, higher leverage standards could offset possible funding cost advantages that these institutions may enjoy as a result of the "too-big-to-fail" problem, which will be considered in the following section.
The Too Big to Fail Problem and Its Impact on Recent Legislative Proposals According to a notice jointly issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury; the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance, "the perception continues to persist in the markets that some companies remain "too big to fail," -posing, in their view, an ongoing threat to the financial system. 10 It is also added that:
11
-First, the existence of the "too-big-to-fail" problem reduces the incentives of shareholders, creditors and counterparties of these companies to discipline excessive risk-taking by the companies.
-Second, it produces competitive distortions because companies perceived as "too big to fail" can often fund themselves at a lower cost than other companies. This distortion being regarded as unfair to smaller companies, damaging to fair competition, and such distortion tends to artificially encourage further consolidation and concentration in the financial system.
As well as the important objective of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) aimed at "mitigating the threat to financial stability posed by systemically-important financial companies" 12 another vital and important means of fostering financial stability in averting another Financial Crisis, safeguarding and assisting financial institutions to navigate periods of financial or economic stress, in the agencies' experience, is strong capital. In their opinion, the "maintenance of a strong base of capital at the largest, systemically important institutions is particularly important because capital shortfalls at these institutions can contribute to systemic distress and can have material adverse economic effects. Further, they contend that higher capital standards for such institutions would place additional private capital at risk before the Federal deposit insurance fund and the Federal government's resolution mechanisms would be called upon, and reduce the likelihood of economic disruptions caused by problems at these institutions.
13
In accentuating the need for its complementary function and role to the risk-based capital framework, the Basel leverage ratios must be linked to the risk based capital adequacy framework -both in respect of their calculations, metrics and measures, as well as primary objectives and goals in introducing such leverage ratios. Some of the objectives for originally introducing leverage ratios in 2010 being the creation of a "secondary metric which was simple and transparent -whereby regulators could assess balance sheet sizes appropriately" as well as the need to facilitate more consistent modes of measurements of risk weighted assets.
In its aims to address concerns raised by the Basel Committee's June 2013 consultative paper, namely concerns that the Consultative Paper's definition of exposure was "too expansive", that is, "the leverage ratio's denominator was too large" http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/financial-services/regulatory-services/publications/assets/fs-reg-brief-dodd-frank-baselleverage-ratio.pdf. Also see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, "Supervisory Framework for Measuring and Controlling Large Exposures -Final Standard" See particularly paragraph 35 "For the purpose of the large exposures framework, off-balance sheet items will be converted into credit exposure equivalents through the use of credit conversion factors (CCFs) by applying the CCFs set out for the standardised approach for credit risk for risk -based capital requirements, with a floor of 10%. through the use of credit conversion factors. It is also stipulated that the CCFs set out in paragraphs 14-22 of its Annex must be applied to notional amounts -for purposes of determining the exposure amount of Off Balance Sheet (OBS) items for leverage ratio.
C. Components of the Basel III Leverage Ratio and Recent Updates to the Components
The Basel III Leverage Ratio is defined as the Capital Measure (the numerator) divided by the Exposure Measure (the denominator), with this ratio expressed as a percentage and with the basis of calculation being the average of the three month-end leverage ratios over a quarter. 16 As reported by DB Research, the Basel Committee's issuance of its consultation paper on common definitions for the non-binding leverage ratio enshrined in Basel III, is not only considered to be an indication of a clear preference to move to a binding leverage ratio, the new Basel definition, it is further contended, would "disallow much of the derivatives netting which had seen US banks post substantially stronger leverage ratios than most European institutions."
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As highlighted under section B, one of the goals of leverage ratios, as intended by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, is to ensure that both on and off balance sheet leverage of banks are adequately captured and accounted for. Given the revisions which have occurred, following the introduction of the original 2010 Basel Leverage Ratios, it would be expected that subsequent revisions would have the effect of expanding the denominator component, namely the exposure component -as a means of highlighting the commitment to expand the horizons being accounted for, as regards exposures -particularly credit exposures. Even though the numerator component, comprising Tier One capital of the risk-based capital framework, is also important, in line with the goals of adequately capturing on and off balance sheet exposures, the importance of focussing on the denominator component (which comprises of the exposure measure) of the Basel III Leverage Ratio is also illustrated thus: According to the most recent, updated Standard on leverage ratios (hereinafter referred to as "the Final Standard"), issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in January 2014, 18 the exposure measure for the leverage ratio, should generally, follow the accounting value, subject to the following:  On-balance sheet, non-derivative exposures are included in the exposure measure net of specific provisions or accounting valuation adjustments;  Netting of loans and deposits is NOT allowed.
As well as disallowing the "netting" of loans and deposits, the January 2014 final standard 19 on leverage ratios, as issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, in compliance with the June revision, also provides under paragraph 30 that, in order to capture the credit exposure to the underlying reference entity, in addition to the prescribed CCR treatment for derivatives and related collateral, the effective notional amount referenced by a written credit derivative is to be included in the exposure measure.
However, in contrast to its predecessor, which highlighted under paragraph 27 that:
collateral received in connection with derivative contracts does not reduce the economic leverage inherent in a bank's derivatives position. In particular, the exposure arising from the contract underlying is not reduced. As such, collateral received (cash or non-cash) may not be netted against derivatives exposures whether or not netting is permitted under the bank's operative accounting or risk-based framework the Final Standard, paragraph 23 projects a more lenient and cautious tone in its approach to netting:
-collateral received in connection with derivative contracts does not necessarily reduce the leverage inherent in a bank's derivatives position, which is generally the case if the settlement exposure arising from the underlying derivative contract is not reduced. As a general rule, collateral received may not be netted against derivative exposures whether or not netting is permitted under the bank's operative accounting or risk-based framework. Hence, when calculating the exposure amount by applying paragraphs 19 to 21 above, a bank must not reduce the exposure amount by any collateral received from the counterparty.
Furthermore, extended provisions have been included to permit certain netting transactions between counterparties -to the extent that certain provisions and conditions stipulated in the Final Standard are met.
As a means of ensuring consistency, comparability and accuracy in its calculations and measurements, the same coverage as that adopted for regulatory consolidation -as used within the risk-based capital framework, is applied by the Basel III leverage ratio framework. 
D. The 2013 Rule and the Final Rule
The 2013 Rule "revised and replaced the agencies' risk-based and leverage capital standards and established a 3 percent minimum supplementary leverage ratio for banking organizations subject to the agencies' advanced approaches risk-based capital rules." 22 The 2013 rule was adopted as a final rule on July 2, 2013.
Moreover, this final rule:
-Implements a revised definition of regulatory capital; -A new common equity tier 1 minimum capital requirement; -A higher minimum tier 1 capital requirement; and For banking organizations subject to the advanced approaches risk-based capital rules, a supplementary leverage ratio that incorporates a broader set of exposures in the denominator. 23 Following the publication of the U.S Basel III Final Rule, many U.S banking agencies proposed higher leverage capital requirements for the eight U.S bank holding companies (BHCs) which have been identified by the Financial Stability Board, as global systemically important banks ("referred to as 20 "Dodd Frank section 165 compels foreign banks to comply with banking rules. Whereas eight of the largest U.S banks meet the 3% ratio, many foreign banks are permitted to meet the 4% ratio". See S Skyrm, "New Regulation and the Repo Market: Leverage Ratios" http://scottskyrm.com/2014/03/new-regulation-and-the-repo-market-leverage-ratios/ 21 See Financial Stability Board, Update of Group of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) (Nov. 1, 2012) 
Arguments Favouring 2013 Basel Committee Revisions over those Updates Made to Basel Leverage Ratios in the U.S
In commencing this section, it needs to be highlighted that the recent moves and proposals in the U.S, in relation to the Basel Leverage Ratio, are very much welcomed and quite encouraging given the prior concerns that the implementation of Basel rules, regulations and initiatives appeared to be implemented at a slow pace in the U.S. The recent proposals in the U.S serve as indication, not only of the willingness to adopt Basel rules, but also reveal the extra steps being taken to ensure that financial stability is fostered and more rigid and stringent measures to avert another global scale crisis.
Arguments favouring 2013 Basel Committee updates over those 2013 proposals introduced in the US, are partly based on the following:
1) The fact that revisions and proposals undertaken in the U.S are premised on Tier 1 capital, instead of higher-quality Core Tier 1.
2) Recent Basel Guidelines (June 2013) are more extensive in scope as opposed to the denominator of the U.S. leverage ratios which are based on original 2010 Basel Leverage ratios.
3) The cumbersome nature of the supplementary leverage ratio -which in the opinion of many commentators, will be more burdensome for subsidiaries of BHCs to comply with than the generally applicable leverage ratio for U.S. banks. It is calculated using a "tighter definition of Tier 1 capital in the numerator and the denominator includes off-balance sheet exposures such as the grossing-up of derivatives to include collateral and cash" (which is why many banks are likely to want to evade as much inclusion of such derivatives in the denominator -given the value/magnitude of derivatives). The 6% standard is considered by many to be onerous for bank subsidiaries covered by the proposal and may encourage banking groups to conduct certain activities, such as derivatives based activities, away from their subsidiaries.
Furthermore, an introduction of the supplementary leverage ratio, it is most likely envisaged, will result in lower dividends being distributed by the BHCs.
4) The focus accorded to disclosures of the numerator and denominator components of the Basel Leverage Ratios in the Basel June 2013 Guidelines.
Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratios (ESLR) -2014 U.S Revisions
In April 2014, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the FRB) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the OCC) took two important steps: 25 1) The Agencies approved a notice of proposed rulemaking (the "NPR", and the rules stipulated therein, the "Proposed Rules") which would revise the definition and scope of the "total leverage exposure", which is the denominator of the SLR (hence, also the denominator of the enhanced SLR). 2) The Agencies approved final rules (the "Final Rules") that would effectively result in a rise from the SLR's usual 3% minimum SLR standard to 5% for bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of more than $70 billion or assets under custody of more than $10 trillion and 6% for their insured depository institution subsidiaries. Following the issue of the January 2014 revised Basel leverage ratios, PriceWaterhouse were of the opinion that U.S regulators would not only have to decide whether an alteration of the exposure calculations of the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) would be necessary (as a means of further harmonizing with the January 2014 revised Basel leverage ratios), but also decide if they would, more importantly, adjust the Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratios.
26 It is PriceWaterhouse' view that U.S regulators are unlikely to lower the ESLR's 2% buffer -primarily attributable to the fact that U.S regulators are considered to view the ESLR as a "needed complement to risk-based capital standards (as opposed to a "back-stop").
27
The need for consistency in the implementation of Basel requirements and regulations is all the more vital and necessary if practices relating to regulatory capital arbitrage are to be minimised and controlled. Differences in the implementation of Basel requirements and rules across various jurisdictions are evident from the very stringent application of rules in certain jurisdictions -as is recently evidenced by the U.S initiatives aimed at increasing Basel III Leverage ratios (above global standards) to those jurisdictions where more lax approaches have been adopted.
Evidence which highlights the fact that different countries could be inconsistently implementing parts of the Basel rules and regulations -either by consolidating or weakening the original requirements, is illustrated through the following:
28 .
-In the EU, in relation to the Capital Requirements Directive/Regulation IV (CRD/RIV) -where based on evidence from latest proposals and negotiations, EU member states will assume greater independence in their ability to increase capital requirements.
-In China, where the implementation framework for Basel III is considered to be more stringent than the international standard (with a requirement of a higher core tier 1 capital adequacy ratio -5% as opposed to 4.5%, as well as a higher leverage ratio requirement of 4% as opposed to 3%).
-In the U.S, as discussed through this paper, through recent proposals relating to standard and supplementary leverage ratios.
Having highlighted the above, it is also worth mentioning that "over compliance" with rules (and particularly where it appears that such rules or ratios appear to be insufficient) -as indicated by the supplementary ratios in the U.S, is certainly much better than under compliance. 
E. Conclusion
The effects and consequences of the cumbersome nature of the supplementary leverage ratio, it is envisaged, will induce some banking groups to conduct certain activities, such as derivatives based ventures, away from their subsidiaries. Other consequences of recently introduced proposals in the U.S (on Basel III), include a reference by Myles to a separate Federal Reserve proposal -which from December 2012, "requires certain foreign banks to establish a U.S intermediate holding company to house their operations." In Myles opinion, if these holding companies' asset value is significantly high, they would have to comply with the higher leverage ratios.
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As already re-iterated in the paper, the impact of the ESLR's 2% buffer is further accentuated by the "competitive advantage" which the now more aligned revised January 2014 leverage ratio provides non-US banks. From the perspective of other off-balance sheet exposures, the reduced exposure of OBS commitments via the January 2014 Basel revisions is considered to result in a treatment which is more beneficial to foreign banks than the Supplementary Leverage Ratio's treatment. 30 This being the case since comparatively higher capital costs for US banks (in providing credit commitments to retail and corporate borrowers) are considered 31 to result from the disparity in CCFs for commitments.
U.S banks however benefit from the perspective of Securities Financing Transactions -since as rightly argued, 32 even though the January 2014 Basel revisions "closes the gap in ability to net on-balance sheet SFT exposures" -with respect to the Supplementary Leverage Ratio, U.S banks still benefit from the continued exclusion of Off Balance Sheet SFTs from leverage exposure.
Despite the merits of improved consistency and harmonisation in the implementation of Basel rules and regulations -such merits including enhanced facilitation of disclosure and transparency, a balance also needs to be struck between the need to avoid a "one size fits all" situation whereby the needs of respective jurisdictions are not met.
The need to achieve more relevant and accurate results is evidenced by the evolution of the Basel capital accords from the rather "crude" original 1988 Capital Accord (which even though risk based, focussed exclusively on credit risk and did not apply risk weights in a specific and tailor made manner to asset classes) to the adoption of more tailor made and specific internal ratings models. 29 Myles also adds that this is exacerbated by the fact that foreign banks are the biggest dealers in US treasuries -"which are penalised by un-weighted measures such as leverage ratios" and that further, it is also possible that branches might have to comply with U.S leverage ratios -based on how the Fed Reserve construed its comparability test." See D Myles, 'How U.S 5% Leverage Ratio Could Catch Foreign Banks' <http://www.iflr.com/Article/3234308/Banking/How-US-5-leverage-ratio-could-catch-foreign-banks.html 30 PricewaterhouseCoopers, "Regulatory Brief: Basel Leverage Ratios: No Cover For US Banks" January 2014 page 3 http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/financial-services/regulatory-services/publications/assets/fs-reg-brief-dodd-frank-baselleverage-ratio.pdf 31 See ibid 32 ibid Whilst comparability and consistency, which is sometimes attributed to simpler and cruder models, may be desired, it is also vital that results derived from such models reflect the reality and accuracy of prevailing conditions -hence the need to provide for models which provide and generate credible results.
As identified by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in its discussion paper "The Regulatory Framework: Balancing Risk Sensitivity, Simplicity and Comparability," 33 the disadvantages attributed to undue complexity and reduced comparability in the capital framework, potentially" include:
-Increased difficulties for bank management in understanding the regulatory regime; -The challenges arising in capital planning; -Less accurate risk assessments; -The creation of regulatory gaps and opportunities for arbitrage; -An undermining of the ability of supervisors to effectively assess the capital adequacy of banks -Impediments presented to the effective review of the capital management process by supervisors.
Achieving an appropriate balance between consistency, comparability, standardization and the need for accurate results is demonstrated by the Federal Reserve's flexible approach in applying bank stress testing techniques. As reported, 34 through the provision of a common set of scenarios to all firms, the results of company-run and supervisory stress tests for bank holding companies are intended to be based on comparable underlying assumptions. To further enhance comparability, the supervisory stress tests and company-run stress tests conducted under the Dodd Frank stress test rules use the same set of capital action assumptions. 
